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is Adaptive Clustering for Scalable Group Key Management (ASGK). According to ASGK proto-
col, the multicast group is divided into clusters, where each cluster consists of areas of members.
Each cluster uses its own Trafﬁc Encryption Key (TEK). These clusters are updated periodically
depending on the dynamism of the members during the secure session. The modiﬁed protocol
has been proposed based on ASGK with some modiﬁcations to balance the number of affected
members and the encryption/decryption overhead with any number of the areas when a member
joins or leaves the group. This modiﬁed protocol is called Ancestors protocol. According to Ances-
tors protocol, every area receives the dynamism of the members from its parents. The main objective
of the modiﬁed protocol is to reduce the number of affected members during the leaving and joining
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Multicasting is considered an efﬁcient solution for group com-
munication on the Internet [1]. Instead of sending a separate
copy of data per receiver, a sender can send a single copy
and the multicast routers in the network make copy and for-
ward packets appropriately to all receivers. Thus, multicasting
utilizes network resources such as bandwidth and buffer space
efﬁciently, and reduces load at the sender(s), as well as, the
transit routers [1,2].
In order to secure group communications, security mecha-
nisms such as authentication, access control, integrity, and
conﬁdentiality are required.Most of these mechanisms rely gen-
erally on encryption using one or several keys. Themanagement
of these keys, which includes creating, distributing, and updat-
ing the keys, constitutes a basic block to build secure group com-
munication applications. Group communication conﬁdentiality
requires that only valid users could decrypt the multicast data
even if the data is broadcasted to the entire network [3].
The conﬁdentiality requirements can be translated further
into four key distribution rules [4]:
 Non-group conﬁdentiality: Users that were never part of the
group should not have access to any key that can decrypt
any multicast data sent to the group.
 Forward conﬁdentiality: Users who left the group should
not have access to any future key. This ensures that a mem-
ber cannot decrypt data after leaving the group.
 Backward conﬁdentiality: A new user that joins a session
should not have access to any old key. This ensures that a
member cannot decrypt data sent before he joined the
group.
 Collusion freedom: Any set of fraudulent users should not
be able to deduce the currently used key.
The work in this paper focuses on group key management
by using a symmetric cryptosystem such as Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) [5]. In this system, a symmetric key is used
to encrypt data by the source and to decrypt it by the receivers.
This key is generally called Trafﬁc Encryption Key (TEK).
In order to meet the above requirements, a re-key process
should be triggered after each join/leave to or from the secure
group. It consists of generating a new TEK and distributing it
to the members including the new one in case of a join or to the
residual members in case of a leave. This process ensures that a
new member can not decrypt eventually stored multicast data
before its joining and prevents a leaving member from eaves-
dropping future multicast data.
A critical problem with any re-key technique is scalability;
as the re-key process is triggered at each membership change.
The number of encryption key update messages may be impor-
tant in case of frequent join and leave operations, and induces
what is commonly called the 1 affects n phenomenon [6]. Some
solutions have been proposed to organize the group into areaswith different local trafﬁc encryption keys. This reduces the 1
affects n impact of the key updating process, but needs decryp-
tion and re-encryption operations at the border of areas. These
operations may decrease the communication quality. Such
schemes have to deﬁne a mechanism that decides how a group
should be divided. Ideally, the result of such division is optimal
could be proved. Optimality of course, depends on the chosen
cost functions.
Challal et al. [7] proposed Adaptive Clustering for Scalable
Group Key Management (ASGK) that divides the multicast
group into areas that are managed by Area Security Agents
(ASAs). Areas are organized into clusters, where all agents in
the cluster use the same TEK. These clusters are updated peri-
odically by each ASGK agent depending on local dynamism
information, i.e. the arrival and leave rate of members. Each
agent in addition receives this information from its parent area
and computes the re-keying overhead and key translation
overhead to decide whether to create a new cluster or to use
the TEK of its parent agent. The ASGK protocol scales well
to large groups by balancing the 1 affects n overhead and
the encryption/decryption operations through the adaptive
structures of the clusters depending on the membership
dynamism.
However, it is noted that ASGK only approximates the 1
affects n overhead. In particular, the used cost function does
not consider the number of affected members. The Ancestors
protocol will be proposed to provide a better balance between
encryption/decryption overhead and mutual impact overhead
where mutual impact overhead is expressed as a function of
the affected number of members.
The 1 affects n and the re-encryption overheads are consid-
ered relative important when deﬁning an overall cost function
for group key management. For a given cost function and a
ﬁxed group membership it is then possible to deﬁne optimal
splits of the group into areas. With dynamic group member-
ship, a split may become suboptimal due to membership
changes and the areas have to be updated to maintain an opti-
mal splitting of the group. This process has overheads of its
own.
In the following, a ﬁxed infrastructure of areas arranged as a
tree is assumed. Each area is managed by an Area Security
Agent (ASA). The ASA of area Ai is denoted by ai. An area
can be active and use a TEK different than that of its parent
or passive and use the same TEK as its parent. Areas that share
the sameTEK form a cluster. The set of areas in the same cluster
as area Ai are denoted by CðAiÞ. By abuse of notation we write
ak 2 CðAiÞ to denote that ak is the ASA of an area Ak in CðAiÞ.
An ASA switches between active and passive state depend-
ing on the number of members that have joined the area. The
speciﬁcation of the algorithm that decides which area a new
member will join is outside the scope of this paper. When
designing an algorithm for updating the state of an ASA, it
is desirable to make decisions based as much as possible on
local information.
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Figure 1 Adaptive Clustering for Scalable Group Key Manage-
ment Architecture [7].
Table 1 1 Affects n overhead for join request.
Steps Messages Aﬀected entities
Step 4 1 jCðAiÞjareas
Step 5 jCðAiÞjareas jCðAiÞjmembers
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Challal et al. proposed the Adaptive Clustering for Scalable
Group Key Management (ASGK) protocol [7], which follows
the approach just described. Fig. 1 illustrates the components
of the ASGK architecture. ASGK offers an adaptive protocol
that maintains good performance during an entire multicast
session. The ASGK protocol consists of three phases; join,
leave, and update phases.
The multicast communication is denoted with ), unicast
communication with!, and out-of-band communication with
#. There are multicast channels are assumed from each ASA
to the members in its area, and a multicast channel between the
ASAs.
2.1. Join phase
When a new member mij joins in area Ai, all the ASAs in the
cluster CðAiÞ have to distribute a new trafﬁc encryption key
TEK0 to the members in their areas. The following four keys
will be used in the protocol:
 kij: a secret key shared between ai and mij.
 TEK: old trafﬁc encryption key.
 TEK0: new trafﬁc encryption key.
 KEKi: key encryption key shared between ai and all mem-
bers in area Ai.
The following protocol is executed when a new member mij
joins in area Ai:
1. mij ! ai: ‘‘join request’’.
2. ai ! mij : kij.
3. ai ! mij : encðkij;TEK0;KEKiÞ.
4. ai ) fak jak 2 CðAiÞg: ‘‘join in area Ai’’, encðTEK;TEK0Þ.
5. For all ak 2 CðAiÞ; ak ) Ak : encðTEK;TEK0Þ.
2.2. Leave phase
When member mij leaves area Ai, all ASAs in cluster CðAiÞ
have to distribute a new TEK to the members in their areas.
The following six keys are used: kij, TEK, TEK0, KEKi as deﬁned before.
 KEK0i: a new key encryption key for area Ai.
 Kagt: a key encryption key shared between all the ASAs.
The protocol executed when member mij leaves area Ai is as
follows:
1. mij ! ai: ‘‘leave request’’.
2. ai ! fmitjmit – mij 2 Aig: encðkit;TEK0;KEK0iÞ.
3. ai ) fak jak 2 CðAiÞg: ‘‘leave in area Ai’’, encðKagt; TEK0).
4. ak 2 CðAiÞ; k–i: ak ) mik : encðKEKk ;TEK0Þ.
2.3. Cluster update phase
A distributed cluster update phase is executed periodically tak-
ing into account that dynamism distribution over a multicast
session is space and time dependent [8,9]. Each agent records
the arrival and leave rate of members during a given time per-
iod. This is the local dynamism information ki.
In addition, ai securely receives dynamism information ki
from its parent area Aj. ASA ai then computes the 1 affects n
overhead as ki þ kj and the re-encryption overhead qðAiÞ as
2  r  Algt where r is the rate of the multicast trafﬁc and Algt
the computation time per data unit for encryption taking into
consideration the agents’ computation power. Let the factor
x indicate the relative importance of the 1 affects n overhead
in comparison to the re-encryption overhead. Then, ai takes a
local decision to become active or passive depending on the
comparison between the weighted overheads (see Fig. 2).
 If xðki þ kjÞ > qðAiÞ then Ai becomes active and forms a
new separate cluster.
 If xðki þ kjÞ 6 qðAiÞ then Ai becomes passive and merges
with the cluster of its parent.
2.4. Cost functions
Two overheads are induced by clustering a set of areas to use
the same TEK. The ﬁrst relates to key translation at the clus-
ter’s root agent. This overhead depends on the key translation
scheme used. Different schemes have been proposed, such as
Figure 3 ASGK for different binary trees.
Table 2 1 Affects n overhead for leave request.
Steps Messages Aﬀected entities
Step 2 jAijmembers jAijmembers
Step 3 1 jCðAiÞjareas
Step 4 jCðAiÞjareas jCðAiÞjmembers
14 D. Gollmann et al.cipher sequences [10], proxy encryption [11], and the decryp-
tion/re-encryption protocols used in Iolus [6] and KHIP [12].
The Iolus re-encryption overhead in the simulation section will
be used as same as ASGK protocol. The second overhead re-
lates to re-keying due to clustering.
The 1 affects n overhead can be estimated either by the
number of exchanged messages (unicast or multicast) or by
the number of affected entities. Table 1 shows the 1 affects n
overhead for steps 4 and 5 of the ASGK join protocol accord-
ing to these two approaches. Here, jCðAiÞjareas denotes the
number of areas in cluster CðAiÞ and jCðAiÞjmembers the number
of members in cluster CðAiÞ. Table 2 shows the 1 affects n
overhead for steps 2, 3, and 4 of the leave protocol.
2.5. Evaluation of the ASGK protocol
In [7], the disturbance power dpðAiÞ of an area Ai is deﬁned as
the degree dðAiÞ of area Ai in the cluster CðAiÞ, multiplied by
its dynamism information:
dpðAiÞ ¼ ki  dðAiÞ ð1Þ
The 1 affects n overhead uðCÞ of cluster C is captured by
uðCÞ 
X
Aj2C
kj  dðAjÞ ð2Þ
and the cluster’s cost function cðCÞ is deﬁned as
cðCÞ ¼ x  uðCÞ þ qðCÞ ð3Þ
where qðCÞ is as above the re-encryption overhead for C and x
a weight factor.
It is shown in [12] that the update protocol in Section 2.3 is
optimal with respect to this cost function.
However, the update function can induce some non-intui-
tive results. Assume that all areas have the same membership
turnover k. Then, the update condition becomes
x  k > r  Algt ð4Þ
for all ASAs. Hence, either all areas are active or all areas are
passive. Assume further that we have
x  k > r  Algt > x 
k
2
ð5Þ
If the number of areas is doubled so that membership changes
are distributed equitably, it would be moved from a conﬁgura-
tion where all areas are active to a conﬁguration where all
areas become passive forming a single cluster. Note that the
ASGK cost function does not consider the overall number of
members in an area but only those joining and leaving within
the period monitored. As discussed in Section 2.4 the true cost
for some of the steps in the join and leave protocols does de-
pend on the full membership.
For illustration, the number of affected members is mea-
sured for ASGK protocol runs when areas form a binary tree
with seven and 15 areas, respectively. A session of three hours
has been simulated where member arrivals follow a Poisson
distribution with average inter-arrival time of 20 s, and mem-bers remain in a session for 30 min on average. ASAs execute
the cluster update phase every 15 min. Fig. 3 gives the result of
a simulation using x ¼ 1 and a rate of multicast trafﬁc of 10
data units per second. Observe that the number of affected
members for the ASGK protocol with 15 areas is greater than
for a conﬁguration with seven areas.
In summary, the ASGK protocol scales well to large groups
by balancing the 1 affects n and the re-encryption overheads
through the adapting the structure of the clusters depending
on membership dynamism. However, its cost function only
approximates the 1 affects n overhead. In particular, it does
not consider the number of affected members.
The protocol will be proposed that balance 1 affects n and
re-encryption overheads when cost is expressed as a function
of the number of members affected.
3. Ancestors protocol
The setup is the same as in the ASGK protocol. The multicast
group is organized into multiple areas arranged into a tree
structure. Each area is managed by an ASA which is responsi-
ble for the local key management process. An ASA can be in
two possible states, active or passive. An active ASA uses its
own TEK for its area and thus has to decrypt and re-encrypt
received messages before forwarding them to local members.
A passive ASA uses the TEK of its parent area and hence for-
wards received messages to local members without decryption/
re-encryption. So, the states of the ASAs induce a partition of
the areas into a set of clusters. Each cluster is composed of a
set of areas that share the same TEK. The cluster’s root ASA
is active and all internal ASAs are passive.
3.1. Cost function
Let the re-keying overhead be measured by the number of mes-
sages being sent when members join or leave. For measuring
the re-keying overhead during a monitoring period ASA ai
keeps two counters, a counter si holding the total number of
messages it has sent and a counter li holding the number of
current area members. The following algorithm is executed
during a monitoring period:
1. At the start of the period, set si  0; ci  jCðAiÞjareas.
2. When a new member joins, set li  li þ 1 and
si  si þ ci þ 1.
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Figure 5 Ancestors protocol.
Ancestors protocol for scalable key management 153. When a member leaves, set li  li  1 and
si  si þ li þ ci þ 1:
It is assumed that ﬁrst ji members join and then ki members
leave. Then the ﬁnal value of si is:
si  si þ ji  ðci þ 1Þ þ
Xki
z¼1
li þ ji  z
 !
þ ki  ðci þ 1Þ
It is assumed that ﬁrst ki members leave and then ji mem-
bers join. Then the ﬁnal value of si is:
si  si þ ji  ðci þ 1Þ þ
Xki
z¼1
li  z
 !
þ ki  ðci þ 1Þ
Then, si have two values. The ﬁrst one is an upper bound
and the other is a lower bound.
Proof. It is assumed that ﬁrst ki2 members leave and then
ji
2
members join and then ki2 members leave and then
ji
2 members
join. Then the ﬁnal value of si is:
si  si þ ji  ðci þ 1Þ þ
Xki
z¼1
li 
ki
2
þ ji
2
 z
 !
þ ki  ðci þ 1Þ
ð6Þ
Because of the result of this equation is not larger than the ﬁrst
number or not smaller than the second number. Then the two
numbers are an upper and a lower bound.
The cluster’s cost function, CostðCðAiÞÞ, of a cluster CðAiÞ
is deﬁned as the number of affected members, CðCðAiÞÞ, and
the re-encryption overhead qðAiÞ.
CostðCðAiÞÞ ¼ xCðCðAiÞÞ þ qðAiÞ ð7Þ
the number of affected members is
CðCðAiÞÞ ¼
XAj parent ofAi
Ai ;Aj2CðAiÞ
CðAi;AjÞ ð8Þ
and
CðCðAiÞÞ ¼
X
Am2CðAiÞ
sm ð9Þ
Finally,
CostðCðAiÞÞ ¼
X
Am2CðAiÞ
sm þ qðAiÞ ð10ÞFigure 4 Different binary trees for Ancestors protocol.Then, the cluster’s cost function is based on the true number of
affected members in the cluster and the re-encryption
overhead. h
3.2. Evaluation protocol
For illustration, the number of affected members is measured
for the Ancestors protocol using a binary tree with seven
and 15 areas, respectively. The protocol is implemented by
using the some features as in Fig. 3. According to the simula-
tion results, the number of affected members with 15 areas is
fewer comparing with seven areas (see Fig. 4). It is found that
the number of affected members are balanced using seven and
15 areas (see Fig. 5).
Therefore, the protocol satisﬁes the balance between mu-
tual impact and re-encryption overheads when cost is ex-
pressed as a function of the number of members affected.
4. Cluster update protocol for Ancestors
When the cluster update protocol is executed, every Ai receives
the affected members information of areas on the path via pas-
sive ancestor areas toward the ﬁrst active ancestor area, i.e. to
the cluster head responsible for generating the cluster TEK. We
denote the set of Ancestors of area Ai by AðAiÞ. Then Ai com-
putes the 1 affects n overhead FAðAiÞ by:
FAðAiÞ ¼
X
Ak2AðAiÞ
sk ð11Þ
The re-encryption overhead qðAiÞ is deﬁned as in Section 2.3.
Then, Ai becomes active or passive depending on the compar-
ison between these two overheads (see Fig. 5).
 If FAðAiÞ > qðAiÞ then Ai becomes active and forms a new
separate cluster.
 If FAðAiÞ 6 qðAiÞ then Ai becomes passive and merges with
the cluster of its parent.
According to the Ancestor protocol, each agent takes a lo-
cal decision relying on the affected members information of the
ancestor areas in the cluster.
5. Proof of optimality
Deﬁnition 1. Let x and y be area security agents, with x parent
of y. If qðyÞ 6 Cðx; yÞ, then if y takes the decision to become
active this will decrease the total cost of the partition [12].
16 D. Gollmann et al.Deﬁnition 2. Let x and y be area security agents, with x parent
of y. If Cðx; yÞ 6 qðyÞ, then if y takes the decision to become
passive this will decrease the total cost of the partition [8].
It is supposed when all of the ASAs take their decisions, the
resulting partition will be the optimal solution. To proof of
optimality, the total cost induced by our Ancestors protocol
partitioning is denoted by Cost(New). The total cost induced
by any other partition is denoted by Cost(Other). The areas
that make the difference are denoted by fa [ fp where
fp ¼ fAp1;Ap2; . . .g are the passive agents in the other partition
which are active in the proposed protocol, and
fa ¼ fAa1;Aa2; . . .g are the active agents in the other partition
which are passive in the proposed protocol. According to the
cost function in Eq. (7), we follow that:
CostðOtherÞ  CostðNewÞ
¼
XAk parent ofApi
Api2zetap
ðCðApi;AkÞ  qApiÞÞ
þ
XAk parent ofAai
Aai2zetaa
ðqðAaiÞ  CðAai;AkÞÞ ð12Þ
According to Deﬁnition 1 the quantity:
XAk parent ofApi
Api2zetap
ðCðApi;AkÞ  qðApiÞÞ ð13ÞFigure 6 Comparison of 1 affects n overhead.
Figure 7 Comparison of cost.is positive, and according to Deﬁnition 2, the quantity:
XAk parent ofAai
Aai2zetaa
ðqðAaiÞ  CðAai;AkÞÞ ð14Þ
is positive also. This means that
CostðNewÞ 6 CostðOtherÞ ð15Þ
and hence the proposed protocol partition is an optimal solu-
tion. Then, the Ancestors protocol outperformed the ASGK
protocol.
6. Simulation results
A comparative study has been implemented between the
Ancestors protocol and ASGK protocol using ns2 simulator
run sunstation with linux operating system. According to
Fig. 6 by using the proposed Ancestors protocol, the 1 affects
n overhead is smaller than that the ASGK protocol through
the whole update times. According to Fig. 7, the proposed
Ancestors protocol has the same nearly cost as the ASGK pro-
tocol. Generally, the proposed Ancestors protocol is always
outperformed the ASGK protocol.
7. Conclusion and future work
7.1. Conclusion
Consider group key distribution to a large and dynamic group.
In most applications, some members join and leave any time,
these joins and leaves induce re-keying. Changes in group
membership require new keys to be distributed. To manage
the overhead thus created, a multicast group can be split into
areas, where areas form clusters so that each cluster uses its
own Trafﬁc Encryption Key. It is noted that all proposed pro-
tocols suffer from great concerns depending on group dyna-
mism where the common TEK approaches suffer from the 1
affects nphenomenon, where a single group membership (join
or leave) changes results in a re-keying process such that all
group members have to update the TEK.
Moreover, ASGK protocol relies on dynamic clustering of
encryption areas depending on the actual membership dyna-
mism which has been shown to be time and space dependent.
But ASGK protocol has disadvantage that the number of af-
fected members will grow with the number of areas. ASGK
protocol is modiﬁed by introducing Ancestors protocol. In
Ancestors protocol, each agent receives up to the number of
affected members of areas of the path from passive parent’s
area to active parent’s area. The objective of this protocol is
to satisfy the balanced between the 1 affects n overhead and
the encryption/decryption overhead. According to the simu-
lated results, it is found that our Ancestors protocol is optimal
solution.7.2. Future work
Instead of sending data independently to clients by the server,
the peer-to-peer multicast scheme could be used to redistribute
the serving load among the clients. This modiﬁcation will dra-
matically reduce the server’s resource requirement; enable low
bandwidth sources to serve high quality live media to up to 100
clients.
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